Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1971

State of Utah v. Dwain Hatch : Respondent's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Vernon B. Romney and David S. Young; Attorneys for
Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Hatch, No. 12621 (1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5497

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

I

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF TIIE CASE ---·--·------------------------------------···

l

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ____________

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL-----------·------

l

OF THE FACTS____________________

2

ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------

2

POINT I: THE JURY 'VAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED AS TO REASONABLE DOUBT. ___________ ----------------------------------

2

POINT II:
THE TRIAL
COURT'S INSTRUCTION CONSTITUTED ERR 0 R, IT \VAS NOT
ERROR PRE.JUDICIAL TO ANY SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE APPELLANT. ___ ·--···-·-··--···--···-·····--·---------·------------------- 6
CONCLUSION __ ..... ----·-··--------------------······-___________

8

CASES CITED
People v. Clausen, 2 Utah 502 -······-----···---·····-········ 2
State v. Estes, 52 Utah 572, 176 P. 271 ( 1918) ____

6

State v. llines, () Utah 2d 126, 307 P. 2d 887
(1957) ------ - - ------------------ - ····---·· ·····-------·-···-· 4

TABLE OF CONTENTS-Continued

Page
State v. Neal, 1Utah2d 122, 262 P. 2d 756 (1958)
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 110, 870 P. 2d 212
( 1957) -- ------------.----------------------------------...... -..... -.. -.
STATUTES CITED
77-31-81, Utah Code Annotated ( 1958) ··------·-·-·--77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) -·····-·····--------

7

In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No.
12621

D'V AIN HATCII,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
OF THE NATURE
OF Tl-IE CASE
Appellant was tried and cmwicted of second degree
burglary after a jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
Appellant was sentenced to the indeterminate terms
prescribed by law for second degree burglary.

RELIEF SOlTGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the decision of the trial
court be affirmed.

2

OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the facts as stated by the
appellant.
ARGUl\iENT
POINT I
THE JlTRY \VAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED
AS TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant begins his argument by saying that he
could have been a passerby and not a participant in
the crime of which he was convicted. This was precisely the question of fact that was presented to the jury
who found that the evidence indicated and the jury con·
eluded otherwise and convicted the appellant of second
degree burglary. The weighing of questions of fact is
the domain of the jury as provided for by 77-31-31.
Utah Code Annotated ( 1953). The reasons for this
were well stated by this Court in the very early case of
People v. Clauson, 2 Utah 502, 503, where the Court
said:
"So much depends upon the demeanor of
witnesses on the stand, the manner in which
their testimony is given, and which cannot be
brought in or made a part of any record, that
the statute has very properly made the jury
the sole judges of the weight to be given to it."
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The decision of the jury in the trial court was
reached after the jury received instructions from the
Court as to what law they were to apply in making
their decision as to the facts. Appellant claims that instruction 11 ( R. 31) on reasonable doubt is so deficient
as to constitute reversible error. The instruction reads:
"As I have heretofore told you, the burden
is upon the State to prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. The term 'reasonable doubt' means a doubt that is based on
reason and one which is reasonable in view of
all of the evidence. It must be a reasonable
doubt and not a doubt that is merely possible,
fanciful, or imaginary, for almost everything
relating to human affairs may be open to some
possible doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt
which reasonable persons would have from a
fair and impartial consideration of all of the
evidence, and it must fairlv, naturallv and
reasonably arise out of the evidence given in
the case and/ or the lack of evidence in the
case."
.,

w

Appellant objects to the use of "reason" and
"reasonable" in instructing what reasonable doubt
means. The instruction is not wholely circular in its
definition. In part, the instruction says that a reasonable
<loubt is not a doubt that is "merely possible, fanciful,
or imaginary": a reasonable doubt comes from a fair
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and impartial consideration of the eYi<lence, and such 1
doubt " ... must fair]y. naturally and reasonably arise
out of the eYiclence or lack of eYidence in the case.·
There may well be a more comprehensiYe explanatior.
of reasonab]e doubt available, but the trial court's in·
struction as giYen was sufficient to inform the jury a
to what basis any doubt they might entertain shoulc
haYe as to how great their conYiction should he befort
they could conYict the appellant.
1

A court's instructions need not he a perfect one. Ir
speaking about less than perfect instructions this Court
in State v. /lines, 6 l7"tah 2d 126, 307 P.2cl 887 ( 195i
said:

1

"Conceding that the instruction which is
suhjectecl to criticism is not a model of what
an instruction on that subjeet "houl<l be, however, it [sufficiently coYers the subject]. 'Yhen
considered in its entire context and together
with the other instruetions, as they must be,
we do not helic,,e it wcm]cl gi,,e any such misimpression to the jury that it could be considered substantial error prejudicial to the rights
of the defenclant which would warrant a reYersal of his conviction. Such a prejmlic·e will
not he presumed from the mere existence of
irregularity or error."
From this statement it seems clear that before an
instruction is so insufficient as to require reversal of
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the trial court it must create a misimpression in the minds
of the jury, or completely fail to inform them on a
pertinent point of law. As was pointed out earlier, the
instruction clid inform the jury that they must be convinced of the appellant's guilt beyonrl a reasonable
doubt, and there was sufficient definition of reasonable
doubt to giYe the jury some idea of what that term
legally means. The jury need not understand that term
as a lawyer might.
Before a trial court's decision may be overturned
on these grounds, there must be shown by the evidence
presented at trial that there is more than a possibility of
a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury. In State v.
Sullfrrw, 6 Utah 2d 110, 870 P.2d 212 ( 1957), this
Court said at page 114:
" ... It is not sufficient merely that reasonahle minds may have entertained such doubt.
Before a verdict may properly be set aside, it
must appear that the evidence was so incon-

clusi\ e or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds
acting fairly upon it must have entertained
reasonable doubt that defendants committed
the erime. Unless the evidence compels such
conclusion as a matter of law, the verdict must
stand. The
essence of trial by jury is that
the jury are the exclusive judges of the weight
of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses
and the fads to he fouu<l therefrom."
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The evidence in the Court below was not so m·
conclusive that a reasonable mind acting upon it must
have had a reasonable doubt as to the appellant's guilt.
POINT II
ASSUl\iING THE TRIAL COURT'S IN·
STRlJCTIONS CONSTITUTED ERROR, IT
'VAS NOT ERROR PRE.JUDICIAL TO ANY
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF THE APPELLANT.
The Utah Code Annotated ( 1953) 77-42-1 states:
"After hearing an appeal the court must
give judgment without regard to errors or
defects which do not affect the substantial
rights of the parties. If error has been committed, it should not be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. The court must be satisfied that it has that effect before it is warranted in reversing the judgment."
This statutory mandate has been repeated in other
decisions of this court. It was stated in State v. Estes
52 Utah 572, 176 P. 271 ( 1918) at page 577:
"In other words, this court may not reverse a judgment unless some substantial
right of the defendant has been invaded or
ignored."
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As was pointed out aboYe, although the instructions
on reasonable doubt objected to by the appellant uses
the word ''reasonable" several times in explanation of
"reasonable doubt'', there are sufficient other terms
used to give a fair understanding of the meaning of
the term to the ordinary person. The word "reasonable"
itself is of such common usage that the person with an
average education would have adequate understanding
of the word's meaning. This being so, it would be an
unnecessary expenditure of time to search for other
words to he used to explain and define "reasonable",
and if this were to be required, objection to subsequent
words of definition could be raised until the available
supply of such words were exhausted. This is not to be
required. The purpose of a trial is that of seeing justice
done and if the required standards of protection are met
a conviction should not be reversed on inconsequential
grounds. As this court said in State 'l'. Neal, I Utah 2d
122, 126-127, 262 P. 2d 756 (1953):

"'V c are also conscious of the fact that a
trial in the courts of this state is a proceeding
in the interest of justice to determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused and not just a
game. 'Ve will not reverse criminal causes for
mere error or irregularity. It is only when there
has been error which is both substantial and
prejudicial to the rights of the accused that a
reversal is warranted."
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No substantial right of the appellant has been prejudiced.

CONCLUSION
The substantial rights of the appellant have been
protected and his claim is without merit. The decision of
the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROl\INEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Assistant Attorney
General
Attorneys for Respondent

